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Iraq’s sixth parliamentary election since the fall of the Baath regime was held on November 11, 2025, without any complications. One of the most notable features of this election was the increase in voter turnout, which reached 56.11 percent compared to about 42 percent in the previous cycle.
The number of seats won by Shia coalitions also increased to 189, surpassing their previous share of 183 seats out of the 329-seat parliament. Another point worth noting is the improved standing of the Coordination Framework in the new parliament. In the previous assembly, the Shia Coordination Framework held 123 seats and shared 50 additional seats with the Tishreenis (secularists) and several independents. In the new chamber, however, it secured 183 seats without counting on any alliance partners. Interestingly, some secularist lists, such as Adnan al-Zurfi’s Al-Badil, failed to win even a single seat.
A significant factor shaping Iraq’s political trajectory is that the seat difference among winning coalitions, whether Shia, Sunni, or Kurdish, is no longer double or near-double as in past elections. This prevents any one bloc from dominating the others or imposing its will. In practical terms, all leading coalitions must now sit together at the table, negotiate, and secure each other’s satisfaction in order to form a government. They are mutually dependent.
It is also important to note that the vote share of the winning coalitions does not directly define the actual structure of Iraq’s future government, because most coalitions are composed of multiple parties. Large coalitions such as the Reconstruction and Development Alliance led by Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, the State of Law coalition led by Nouri al-Maliki, and even segments of Asaib Ahl al-Haq headed by Qais Khazali consist of multiple parties — some containing as many as eleven. This fragmentation increases the likelihood of internal shifts and realignments as parties maneuver for greater influence. It also limits the coalitions’ ability to exert unified political pressure during government formation, since individual parties want representation based on their own seat count and vote share.
According to Iraq’s Independent High Electoral Commission, the Reconstruction and Development Alliance led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani topped the results with 46 seats. The Taqaddum Party led by Mohammed al-Halbousi won 36 seats, placing it second, and the State of Law coalition led by Nouri al-Maliki came third with 29 seats. The Sadiqoon bloc headed by Qais Khazali secured 28 seats, while the Kurdistan Democratic Party led by Masoud Barzani gained 27.
Overall, Shia lists and coalitions won 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish parties 56 seats, and minority quotas nine seats.
Following the announcement of results, the most consequential political battle now centers on choosing the next prime minister. Internal disagreements within the Shia Coordination Framework — which encompasses most major Shia factions — have intensified. Mohammed Shia al-Sudani insists on remaining in office, while Nouri al-Maliki also presents himself as a strong candidate to lead the next government.
Political analysts note that resistance groups in Iraq place greater trust in Maliki, which could benefit him in negotiations over integrating or disarming these factions. In contrast, al-Sudani argues that success in this area requires the support of the “international coalition” and full state control over weapons.
Sources close to Shia groups indicate that if internal disputes continue, new candidates may emerge. One source close to al-Sudani stated that around twenty names have been floated for the premiership, but none have reached the final stage or received an official nomination.
Before selecting a prime minister, Iraq must first choose its president, traditionally a Kurdish position. However, escalating tensions between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Masoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Bafel Talabani have thrown the process into a new phase of complexity, potentially blocking the formation of the presidency, speakership, and next government.
The KDP argues that, having won the most seats in the Kurdistan Region during the recent Iraqi parliamentary elections, it should nominate the president. The PUK strongly opposes this, insisting that the presidency is historically its share, based on longstanding internal agreements that give the KDP the Kurdistan Region presidency and the PUK the federal presidency.
Kurdish disagreements do not end there. One year has passed since the Kurdistan Region’s local parliamentary elections, yet due to deep internal divisions, they have still not formed a regional government. This weakens the Kurdish position in negotiations with other political groups and will likely diminish their influence in securing ministerial positions.
Meanwhile, major Sunni political actors are also maneuvering. Five leading Sunni groups have announced the formation of a new parliamentary alliance called the National Political Council. Observers view it as a Sunni counterpart to the Shia Coordination Framework, though they question its durability. The new council holds a collective 60 seats and aims to negotiate for the position of parliamentary speaker and several cabinet posts. If the alliance remains intact, smaller Sunni groups may join it as well.
Before the elections, the United States attempted to fuel political polarization in Iraq by pitting pro-resistance and anti-resistance factions against one another. These efforts failed due to high voter turnout and the electoral success of pro-resistance parties, though Washington continues to pressure resistance groups.
With the parliamentary elections now concluded, Iraq enters a new phase in its young democracy. Analysts suggest two possible scenarios for Iraq’s political future.
The first scenario is highly optimistic:
A government will be formed quickly and smoothly. If this occurs, the process will proceed without major obstacles, especially since Sunni and Kurdish parties, provided the Coordination Framework agrees, will be compelled to strike internal compromises and align with the Shia bloc.
The second scenario is less favorable:
Disputes within the Coordination Framework over the premiership could escalate, triggering political tensions, delays in forming the cabinet, and possibly broader instability. If disagreements persist, Sunni and Kurdish blocs are likely to exploit the situation to extract more concessions and secure political gains.
Political factions across Iraq — Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish — understand the fragile state of the region and recognize that neither Iraq nor the broader Middle East can withstand further crises. Swift government formation is essential to prevent escalation and reinforce stability in both Iraq and the region.
Translated by Ashraf Hemmati from the original Persian article written by Mohammad Saleh Ghorbani
[1] http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/fa/news/2036329/%D8%AA%D8%AD%D9%88%D9%84%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D9%85%DB%8C%D9%82-%D9%88-%D9%88%DB%8C%DA%98%DA%AF%DB%8C-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D8%A8%D8%B1%D8%AC%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%87-%D8%A7%D9%86%D8%AA%D8%AE%D8%A7%D8%A8%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82
[1] https://farsnews.ir/fgholami/1763445179527364532
[1] https://www.ilna.ir/fa/tiny/news-1722710
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