General Qassem
Soleimani whose illegal assassination last year triggered a swath of
condemnation from politicians all over the world and escalated the tensions
between Iran and the U.S. – ceased to be a conventional commander decades ago
when Iran was fighting a devastating war with Saddam Hussein in the 1980s.
During the eight
years of horrific warfare, amid the poison gas and minefield explosions and
mass destructive bombs, the young commander showed an intense devotion to his
people and his country.
But he also
became famous for his loyalty and commitment to his fighters and their families
– and his distress at the loss of life in useless direct attacks and
conventional faceoffs against a conventional enemy.
After the war,
General Soleimani chose a different direction in stark contrast with other commanders
and avoided that kind of conventional warfare, instead he sought after an
indirect modus operandi we might call the “Hezbollah model,” after its most
outstanding and victorious example.
Hezbollah, a
strategic ally of Iran and a divisive force who fought against Israel’s 1982
invasion of Lebanon, initially used the human-wave tactics taught by their
Iranian trainers, many of whom had been created and used in the war with Iraq.
These proved
costly in terms of human casualties in Lebanon, as they had in Iran, but
Hezbollah fighters soon developed their operational style with the assistance
of Iranian fighters, shaping a new form of guerilla warfare some analysts have
called the “guerrilla laboratory.”
The technique
includes dispersed light infantry tactics, carefully hidden roadside bombs, sneaky
hit-and-run raids, exceptional mortar and rocket utilities, professional human
and electronic intelligence. Mix this deadly cocktail with a background of
complex geographical terrain and extensive military training.
Moreover,
Hezbollah provided a unique package of social, economic, education, health, and
welfare services for the people in southern Lebanon.
General
Soleimani also created labor unions and youth organizations, built mass-media
outlets, including newspapers, magazines, radio, and TV networks, and formed a
political party that is very popular among the Lebanese people. Combining
lethal force with a well
designed administrative
faction, governance, and popularity among common people made Hezbollah extremely
strong and undefeatable.
After the
28-day war in 2006 between Lebanon and Israel, in which Gen. Soleimani was indirectly
the commander, Hezbollah’s strong reconstruction and its dedication to providing
social-service to those affected by the war, succeeded in securing support for
the group and its cause, so the Axis of Resistance came out of the war stronger
than before.
Gen. Soleimani
and his Axis of Resistance in the Quds Force were quick-witted enough to learn
from their Lebanese creation and went on to apply the Hezbollah model all over
the regions. Countries with heavy U.S. military presence like Iraq, Syria,
Afghanistan, and Yemen.
During the war
against the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, the Axis of Resistance forces under the
commandment of Gen. Soleimani deployed revolutionary tactics in fielding highly
sophisticated roadside bombs that killed more than 600 Americans and
caused as much as 30 percent of all American losses.
The Resistance
forces mastered the art of swift and precise rocket and mortar attacks on
American bases, often managing to hit and run before retaliation could arrive.
Years later,
when Syria seemed on the edge of collapse, Gen. Soleimani and the Axis of
Resistance forces helped save the country and its people from total
annihilation.
Likewise,
in Yemen, when the Houthi revolutionaries overthrow the undemocratic Abdrabbuh
Mansur Hadi government and captured Sanaa, drawing a military intervention from
Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies, Gen. Soleimani was the one who helped the
Houthis a Hezbollah-like mix of military training and a suite of social,
religious and administrative services to help the people who were suffering
under the international harsh sanctions
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