Poisoned by Its Own Game: How Turkey Drank Israel’s Qajar Coffee in Syria

One year has passed since Iran withdrew from Syria, and al-Jolani—backed fully by Turkey and the United States—took control of the country.

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who for years had dreamed of a Syria without Assad and the revival of Ottoman grandeur, never imagined that one day he would long for the stability of the Assad era.

Today, as Jolani openly defies Ankara’s directives and increasingly plays the role of an Israeli proxy, Turkey’s president understands something he failed to see before:

the coffee Hakan Fidan drank with him on the heights of Damascus after Jolani’s rise to power was not an Ottoman brew—but Qajar coffee, poured into an Ottoman cup, prepared by Israel.

In Iranian political history, “Qajar coffee” carries a dark meaning.

During the Qajar era, poisoned coffee was a silent tool of elimination—used to remove rivals and opponents without open confrontation.

Now, it appears Turkey has unknowingly been poisoned by the very Syrian transformation it helped engineer.

Throughout its years in Syria, Iran sought to preserve the region’s traditional balance, preventing Israeli expansionism.

Turkey, however, believed that by dismantling this order, it could emerge as the winner of Middle Eastern rivalries and secure a share of Syria’s vast resources.

Yet Jolani—despite being nurtured and elevated by Ankara—quickly reinvented himself as a self-serving actor once in power.

An actor who now sees his survival and profit in compromise and cooperation with Israel.

This alignment has gone so far that Jolani has, in practice and unofficially, handed over his birthplace and large portions of Syrian territory to Israel.

Israel, for its part, has invested heavily in a corridor project inside Syria—using it to threaten Turkey and other regional powers, to the point that open military threats against Ankara are now on the table.

As the picture becomes clearer, Erdoğan—years after the martyrdom of Qassem Soleimani—has come to understand what he once dismissed:

that containing the terrorist state of Israel is only possible through regional stability.

A strategy Soleimani consistently pursued, even as he endured relentless criticism for it.

This realization helps explain Ankara’s recent softer tone and more flexible posture toward Tehran.

But the central question remains:

Can Erdoğan—despite years of concessions to Israel and deep commercial ties with the regime—stand up to an Israel that dreams of neighboring, and perhaps devouring, large parts of Syria and the wider Middle East?

Reports suggest Turkey may ask Iran to return to Syria.

Yet this time, it seems unlikely that Iran will be willing to shoulder the burden of confronting Israeli threats and stabilizing West Asia alone.

From now on, every political actor must carry its own share of responsibility.